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Abstract 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a pioneer 
technology which has depicted a new lifestyle for humanity 
in all around the world. Every day we observe an increase in 
the scope of RFID applications and no one cannot withdraw 
its numerous usage around him/herself. An important issue 
which should be considered is providing privacy and 
security requirements of an RFID system. Recently in 2014, 
Cai et al. proposed two improved RFID authentication 
protocols based on R-RAPS rules by the names of IHRMA 
and I2SRS. In this paper, we investigate the privacy of the 
aforementioned protocols based on Ouafi and Phan formal 
privacy model and show that both IHRMA and I2SRS 
protocols cannot provide private authentication for RFID 
users. Moreover, we show that these protocols are vulnerable 
to impersonation, DoS and traceability attacks. Then, by 
considering the drawbacks of the studied protocols and 
implementation of messages with new structures, we present 
two improved efficient and secure authentication protocols 
to ameliorate the performance of Cai et al.’s schemes. Our 
analysis illustrate that the existing weaknesses of the 
discussed protocols are eliminated in our proposed 
protocols. 
Keywords: Authentication, RFID protocol, Privacy, 
Security, Ouafi Phan privacy model, Traceability, 
Impersonation 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, our world is transitioning from an internet 
of connected individuals to an internet in which 
everything and everyone is connected, also known as 
Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. Radio Frequency 
IDentification (RFID) is a technology which provides 
a contactless identification through magnetic waves. 
Health-care, livestock and animal tracking, access 
control, transportation and supply chain can be 
mentioned as its applications which play an important 
roles to prepare the structures for developing the 
concept of IoT [2-6]. As it is shown in Fig. 1, RFID 
systems involve three main parts: back-end server, 
reader and tag. The tag is a microchip which can be 
attached to different objects with different purposes in 
an RFID system that falls in one of the three classes: 
active, passive and semi-active [7]. A passive tag does 
not have any battery and obtains sufficient energy to 
reply the reader from the magnetic field achieved 
through sending the request by the reader. An active 
tag contains an inner battery, allows it to start a new 
connection with the reader over than only be a 
responder. Although the semi-active tag holds an inner 
battery, it just responds to the received queries from 
the reader, and performing the internal operations are 
the only usage of the internal battery [8]. Decreasing 
the size and cost of RFID tags, have been led to 
popularity and vast implementation of passive tags in 
most of novel applications. The back-end server stores 
all the information of the tags and the readers, and 
establishes a connection with the tag via tranceiving 
data with the reader and after investigating the 
correctness of transferred messages, authenticates the 
reader and the tag. Although, RFID technology is 
developing rapidly and providing comfort for users, 
deficiency of supplying the necessary security, will 
result in irreparable damages [9]. Therefore, scholars 
have proposed various type of protocols to provide 
security and privacy of end-users in RFID systems, 
which generally classify into four classes based on the 
deployed cryptographic functions [10]. Full-fledged 
are the first classes, include ordinary cryptographic 
functions such as public or private key cryptography 
systems, one-way hash functions and so forth [2]. 
Random Number Generators (RNG) and one-way  
Fig. 1. A System model of RFID systems  
hash functions are permitted to use in the second class. 
The third class is called lightweight, includes RNG 
functions and Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) 
checksums[4]. Finally, ultra-lightweight is the last 
classification, limited to the usage of simple bitwise 
operators such as AND, OR and XOR [11]. 
By paying attention to the mentioned classification, 
several protocols have been presented in the last few 
years [6, 12-16]. Yeh et al. proposed an RFID 
authentication protocol based on EPC Class 1 
Generation 2 standard in 2010 which supplies tag 
privacy [6]. In 2011, Yoon declared that Yeh et al.’s 
protocol is still vulnerable to data integrity and 
forward secrecy problems [13]. So, he suggested an 
improved protocol available in places with high level 
of security. In 2011, Cho et al. proposed a hash-based 
RFID mutual authentication protocol [17]. They 
believe that their scheme solves the privacy and 
forgery problems as well as provides all the security 
requirements of RFID users [17]. In 2014, Cai et al. 
investigated Cho et al. and Yoon’s protocols through 
their paper [18]. They believe that preparing the 
authentication procedure should be designed and 
confirmed theoretically before testing experimentally. 
So, they defined rules by the name of R-RAPSE which 
provides security and privacy for RFID protocols [18]. 
They found that Cho et al.’s protocol does not provide 
data integrity. Moreover, it is vulnerable to de-
synchronization attack, therefore they proposed the 
IHRMA protocol based on R-RAPSE rules, which is 
an improved version of Cho et al.’s protocol. They also 
diagnosed that Yoon’s protocol cannot preserve the 
location of tag owner, which results in weaknesses for 
providing privacy issues. Thus, they proposed the 
I2SRS protocol as a modified for Yoon’s protocol [7]. 
In this paper, we analyze the IHRMA and I2SRS 
protocols and show that there are still some flaws in 
their protocols. It is exposed that similarity between 
the generated messages and updating procedures will 
make the IHRMA protocol vulnerable to tag and 
reader impersonation. Beside revealing the secret key 
in the I2SRS protocol, shown that an attacker can 
perform tag impersonation, traceability and forward 
traceability attacks after maximum 216 computations 
and backward traceability attack with 217 runs in the 
worst case. 
Recently, different types of privacy model have been 
proposed to study the authentication routine in RFID 
protocols [19-26]. Among these formal privacy 
models, Ouafi-Phan privacy model [23] is one of the 
well-known privacy models which has been proposed 
in 2008 and due to pertinent queries for different 
privacy analysis, it has got more attention by 
researchers [18-22]. We use this privacy model for 
privacy analysis of the IHRMA and I2SRS protocols. 
A summary of Ouafi-Phan privacy model and its usage 
in privacy analysis can be found in our last paper [7]. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2 we analyze the IHRMA protocol and its 
vulnerabilities are discussed. We do the same for the 
I2SRS protocol in Section 3. Our improved RFID 
authentication protocols are presented in Section 4. 
The proposed protocol are compared with some 
existing ones in the terms of security and privacy in 
Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6. 
2. IHRMA protocol 
2.1 Analyzes of IHRMA protocol 
Cai et al. believe that R-RAPSE rules provide 
sufficient security in their protocol [18]. So, to prevent 
de-synchronization of secret information in two sides 
of protocol, they proposed their improved protocol 
based on R-RAPSE instructions which provide data 
integrity via hash functions in their method. The 
structure of IHRMA protocol is depicted in Fig. 2. The 
connections between the reader and the back-end 
server are secure, while the communications between 
the reader and the tag are insecure. In this section, we 
analyze the IHRMA protocol and prove that their 
protocol is vulnerable to tag and reader impersonation 
attacks. The notations used in this protocol are as 
follow: 
RIDi : Group ID of random number. 
IDk : The ID of the tag k. 
Sj : Secret value mutually shared between the server 
and the tag, used in the jth session. 
Rt : Random number generated by the tag. 
Rr : Random number generated by the reader. 
C1 : Data generated by the tag for authentication. 
C2 : Blind factor. 
Back-end Server (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗−1,𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) Reader Tag (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 For each tuple (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘;  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) 
        Calculate 𝐶𝐶2∗ = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗(0: 47) ∥ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘(48: 95) 
Calculate 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗     
Compute 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗         
verify  𝐶𝐶1∗ ≟ 𝐶𝐶1 
             if it does not match 
             repeat with tuple (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘;  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗−1) 
if it does not match, Reveal the protocol 
4.2 calculate 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝐶𝐶2⨁𝐶𝐶2∗ 
4.3 calculate 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ 
4.4 calculate 𝐶𝐶1∗ = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) 
4.5 calculate 𝐶𝐶3 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) 
4.6 calculate 𝐶𝐶4 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1 
4.7 calculate 𝐶𝐶5 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝐻𝐻(𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1) 
4.8 
               𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷∥𝐶𝐶3∥𝐶𝐶4∥𝐶𝐶5                  
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4.9 updating 
         𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 − 1 ← 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗   𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 1 
 
1.1 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅: 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 
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3.1 
               𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟               
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              𝐶𝐶3∥𝐶𝐶4∥𝐶𝐶5                   
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2.1 𝐶𝐶1 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) 
2.2 𝐶𝐶2 = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗(0: 47) ∥ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘(48: 95) 
2.3 
                    𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡                
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6.1 calculate 𝐶𝐶3∗ = 𝐻𝐻(𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) 
     if 𝐶𝐶3∗ ≠ 𝐶𝐶3 
          reveal the protocol 
     else 
       6.2 calculate 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝐶𝐶4 
       6.4 calculate 𝐶𝐶5∗ = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝐻𝐻(𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1) 
             if 𝐶𝐶5∗ ≠ 𝐶𝐶5 
                 reveal the protocol 
             else 
      Server is authenticated 
6.2 updating     𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 1 
Fig. 2. IHRMA protocol [18]
2.2 Tag impersonation attack 
Here now we show that the IHRMA protocol cannot 
prevent an adversary 𝒜𝒜 from performing 
impersonation attacks. Cai et al. have used 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
operator in construction of 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and they have 
believed that it will result better performance of their 
protocol [18]. 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  is described as follow: 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 1)(0: 47) ∥ (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 −                  𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗)(48: 95)                                 (1) 
Notion1: There is a characteristic in the 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 operator, 
which is described here. If we have 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 as two 
integers and 𝑎𝑎 < 𝑏𝑏, then 𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑏𝑏 will result in 𝑎𝑎. 
Using Notion 1, in the IHRMA protocol [18], there 
will be a situation where 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 < 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, results in  
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 1)(0: 47) ∥ (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡)(48: 95) 
             𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = (1)(0: 47) ∥ (𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗)(48: 95)                 (2) 
Now, an adversary can perform tag impersonation 
attack in two phases as follows: 
Learning phase: The attacker 𝒜𝒜 sends an execute 
query (𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷0, 𝑖𝑖), obtains {𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 ,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ,𝐶𝐶3,𝐶𝐶4,𝐶𝐶5}. 
Then by changing the value of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡, which makes new 
messages as 𝐶𝐶4 and 𝐶𝐶5, prevents the back-end server 
authentication in the tag side. Therefore, the secret 
value will not be updated in the tag. 
Attack phase: In session (𝑖𝑖 + 1), the attacker 
impersonates him/herself as a trusted tag. To this aim, 
the adversary performs as follows:  
A. After receiving 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟′  from the reader in the (𝑖𝑖 + 1) 
session, the attacker 𝒜𝒜 calculates 𝐶𝐶1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 and 𝐼𝐼1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  with 
the values stored in the last session, and sends them to 
the reader. 
𝐶𝐶1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = 𝐶𝐶1                               (3) 
𝐼𝐼1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = 𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1                 (4) 
B. Reader puts 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 beside 𝐶𝐶1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 and 𝐼𝐼1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹, sends 
them all to the back-end server. 
C. The back-end server calculates 𝐶𝐶2∗ and obtains 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1 
as described below: 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝐼𝐼1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹⨁𝐶𝐶2∗                     (5) 
D. By computing 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1, the back-end server 
calculates 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1. As we stated before, if 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 < 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, the 
obtained 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1 is equal with eq. (1). 
E. The back-end server, computes 𝐶𝐶1
∗(𝑖𝑖+1) and 
authenticates the tag, if 𝐶𝐶1∗(𝑖𝑖+1) = 𝐶𝐶1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 . By 
considering the situation which 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 < 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1 <
𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and the back-end server will verify 
the tag as a legal one, update its secret values and send 
𝐶𝐶3
𝑖𝑖+1, 𝐶𝐶4𝑖𝑖+1 and 𝐶𝐶5𝑖𝑖+1 to the reader. Ultimately, the 
back-end server endorses the falsified tag as an 
allowable one.   
Proof:  
     𝐶𝐶1
∗(𝑖𝑖+1) = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1) 
                 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1) 
                 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1) 
                 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) 
                 = 𝐶𝐶1,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹                                                    (6) 
The adversary will be succeed, if the assumptions are 
correct. For random selection of Rt and Rr, the success 
probability of each assumption is ½. The total 
probability of the above attack is ¼, while it’s 
complexity of is two runs of the protocol.  
2.3 Reader impersonation attack  
As discussed in subsection 2.2 the structure of 
generating 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  in the IHRMA protocol which is 
shown in equation (1), allows the attacker to perform 
tag impersonation attack. Now, we want to express 
that this type of producing 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, will result in reader 
impersonation attack, with the success probability of 
1/4, too. Its implementation can be described as 
follows: 
Learning phase: The attacker eavesdrops the 𝑖𝑖th 
session of the protocol by sending an execute query 
(𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷0, 𝑖𝑖) and obtaining {𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 ,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ,𝐶𝐶3,𝐶𝐶4,𝐶𝐶5}. 
Now, to prevent updating secret values, the attacker 
blocks the 5.1 step of the protocol. 
Attack phase: The attacker 𝒜𝒜 acts as a reader and 
starts a new session by generating 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 randomly and 
sending it to the tag 𝐷𝐷0, that leads to reader 
impersonation attack. The manner of these steps are 
discussed below: 
1. The tag did not update its secret values in the last 
session. Moreover, by considering the conformation of 
equation (2), the tag will generate a new 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1, 
calculate 𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖+1 and send it with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1 to the counterfeit 
reader which can be written as, 
𝐶𝐶1
𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘⨁ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1⨁ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1)       (7) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖+1⨁ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1                        (8) 
2. As the secret values of the tag did not update during 
the last session, 𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖+1 is equal with 𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖 . Therefore, the 
attacker calculates 𝐶𝐶4𝑖𝑖+1 and 𝐶𝐶5𝑖𝑖+1 through the received 
messages 𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖+1, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+1 and the stored values of last 
session, as follows: 
𝐶𝐶4
𝑖𝑖+1  = 𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖+1⨁ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖⨁ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖⨁𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1 =  𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1                                       (9)  𝐶𝐶5𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖⨁𝐻𝐻(𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1)⨁𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖+1⨁ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖⨁ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  =  𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝐻𝐻�𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗+1�                                  (10) 
and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∥ 𝐶𝐶3𝑖𝑖+1 ∥ 𝐶𝐶4𝑖𝑖+1 ∥ 𝐶𝐶5𝑖𝑖+1} to the tag. 
3. Occurrence the relation of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 < 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 for two runs of 
the protocol with the probability of ½ in each time, 
resulted the tag to authenticate the attacker 𝒜𝒜 as a 
legal one and the attacker performs reader 
impersonation attack with the probability of ¼. 
3. I2SRS protocol 
Cai et al. proposed the I2SRS protocol based on R-
RAPSE rules and believe that their protocol will 
provide all privacy necessity for end-users [18]. Their 
protocol is depicted in Fig. 3 and the channels between 
all parts of this system are insecure. The implemented 
elements in the I2SRS protocol are listed below: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠: Each EPC block with 96 bits, divided to six 
blocks with 16 bits length. Xoring these six blocks 
generates 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠. 
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖: Confirmation key stored in the back-end server. 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 : Access key stored in the tag, to authenticate the 
back-end server. 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖: The back-end server index, stored in the tag to 
find the corresponding information of the tag in the 
server 
3.1 Analyzes of I2SRS protocol 
Cai et al. proposed the I2SRS protocol to provide 
privacy of end-user [18]. They believed, randomness 
of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, prepares sufficient properties to prevent an 
adversary 𝒜𝒜, performs any attacks on their protocol. 
But we find that there are still major weaknesses with 
their protocol. 
Back-end server 
(𝐾𝐾0,𝐸𝐸0,𝛼𝛼0,𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛,𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 ,𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) Reader (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) Tag (𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 For each 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 in server 
         Verify 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) ≟ 𝑉𝑉 
      For each tuple (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠;𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜,𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛) 
4.2 Calculate 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂 = 𝑀𝑀1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜 and 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 = 𝑀𝑀1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 
           Verify 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜) 
           Verify 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛) 
      𝑥𝑥 = 𝑂𝑂/𝑁𝑁      
4.3 Verify 𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥) ≟ 𝛾𝛾 
4.4 Calculate 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥 
      Verify 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 ≟ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗ 
4.5 Calculate 𝑀𝑀2 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗) ⊕𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥  
4.6 Calculate 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 = 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷⊕ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟  
4.7 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) 
4.8 
               𝑀𝑀2,𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜,𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶                 
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4.9 Updating  
      If 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑁𝑁 
            𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜 ↼ 𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛) 
            𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 ↼ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛) 
            𝛼𝛼𝑜𝑜 ↼ 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) 
      Else  
            𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) 
      End if 
1. Generate 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 
1.2 
               𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟                 
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3.1 𝑉𝑉 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) 
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5.1 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚⨁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 
5.2 Verify 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) ≟
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 
5.3 
          𝑀𝑀2             
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2.1 Generate 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 
2.2 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡)⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 
2.3 𝛽𝛽 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖  
2.4 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 
2.5 𝛾𝛾 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) 
2.5 
                    𝑀𝑀1,𝛽𝛽,𝛾𝛾,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖                    
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6.1 Verify 𝑀𝑀2 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡) 
6.2 Updating 
                𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+1 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) 
                𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+1 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) 
                𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) 
Fig 3. I2SRS protocol [18].
3.2 Secret parameter Reveal 
Presence of RFID technology as a main part of 
different systems, compels researchers to present 
novel protocol which provide security and privacy. An 
important issue to be considered is preventing an 
adversary to access secret values, but in this section, 
we will show that the I2SRS protocol is vulnerable to 
secret parameter reveal which is described below: 
Learning phase: An attacker eavesdrops one session 
of the protocol and blocks the step 5.3. Therefore, it 
obtains {𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ,𝑉𝑉, 𝑀𝑀2𝑖𝑖} while the tag did 
not update its secret values. 
Attack phase: The attacker uses stored values from 
the last session and by paying attention to their 
similarity, conjectures the secret value 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 , with the 
probability of 1. The attacker computes 𝑍𝑍 as below: 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ⊕  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕  𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖)           (12) 
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 is a 16 bit string, so it is one of the element of 
{𝔎𝔎1,𝔎𝔎2, … ,𝔎𝔎216}. The attacker knows the value of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
through the last session, so he/she is able to obtain 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 
after maximum 216 runs as below: 
𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹  2 < 𝑖𝑖 < 216 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝔎𝔎1,𝔎𝔎2, … ,𝔎𝔎216}  
𝑊𝑊 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑊𝑊  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖  𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘  
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚                                  (13) 
Therefore, similarity in generating messages through 
I2SRS protocol, makes it vulnerable to protection of 
secret parameters. Moreover, lack of precision in 
updating procedure, allows the attacker 𝒜𝒜 to calculate 
𝐾𝐾, in the (𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥) session by performing 𝑥𝑥 times 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 
of 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖.  
3.3 Tag Impersonation attack 
Revealing the secret parameter in the I2SRS protocol, 
let an adversary 𝒜𝒜 impersonate a legitimate tag after 
maximum 216 runs, which proved in Section 3.2. The 
method of applying this attack is as follows, 
Learning phase: An adversary 𝒜𝒜 sends an Execute 
query (𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷0, 𝑖𝑖) and obtains {𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖}. 
He/she is able to guess 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 with the probability of 1, as 
discussed in Section 3.2 and obtain 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡, 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖                         (14) 
Attack phase: In the next session, after sending a 
request and 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 to the tag by the reader, the attacker 
𝒜𝒜 introduces him/herself as a legal tag and the 
following events take place: 
1. The attacker 𝒜𝒜 generates {𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖+1,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+1,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1} 
as below and sends them to the reader, 
𝑀𝑀1
𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖  
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖′ 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖)  (15) 
As we do not know the value of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠, it is not possible 
to compute 𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖+1 unless we use the same message as 
𝑀𝑀1
𝑖𝑖  and combine other messages as stated above. In the 
other words, by calculating 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 as 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) and 
replacing 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1 with 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1, Messages are 
prepared. 
2. The reader computes 𝑉𝑉 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1) and 
sends {𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖+1,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+1,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1,𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖+1} to the 
back-end server.   
3. As the reader is legal, the back-end server 
authenticates it and to confirm the tag, for each tuple 
(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠;𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜 ,𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛), calculates 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥 = 𝑀𝑀1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥. Given that 
the tag did not update its secret values in the last 
session, 𝑥𝑥 refers to the old parameters. Then, the back-
end server checks if it is equal with (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥) where, 
𝑀𝑀1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1� ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 
                 = 𝐸𝐸�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1�  
                 = 𝐸𝐸�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖� = (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖)                (16) 
4. The back-end server checks the equality of 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) ≟ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+1 and obtains, 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) 
= 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+1  (17) 
5. Finally, the back-end server authenticates the 
attacker as a legal tag and calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+1. 
3.4 Tag traceability attack  
I2SRS protocol does not provide enough privacy issue 
and it is vulnerable to traceability attack which can be 
applied by an adversary 𝒜𝒜, as described below: 
Learning phase: The attacker sends an execute query 
(𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷0, 𝑖𝑖) and stores the obtained values 
{𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉, 𝑀𝑀2𝑖𝑖} in this session and blocks 
the 5.3 step of the protocol to prevent the tag’s 
updating procedure.  
Challenge phase: An attacker 𝒜𝒜 chooses two fresh 
tags 𝐷𝐷0 and 𝐷𝐷1 and sends a Test query (𝐷𝐷0,𝐷𝐷1, 𝑖𝑖 + 1). 
After choosing 𝑏𝑏 ∈ {0,1} randomly, the attacker takes 
the tag 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 . Then, he/she starts a new session by 
generating 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 randomly and sending an Execute 
query (𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 , 𝑖𝑖 + 1) to the tag 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 , which results in 
obtaining {𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖+1,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+1,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1}. 
Guess phase: The attacker 𝒜𝒜 stops the game 𝑃𝑃 and 
announces 𝑏𝑏′ as his/her guess of 𝑏𝑏 as: 
𝑏𝑏′ = �0      𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1       1                     𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅                    (18) 
As a result, we get:     
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢(𝑘𝑘) = �𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏′ = 𝑏𝑏) − 1
2
� = �1 − 1
2
� = 1
2
≫ 𝜀𝜀  (19) 
Proof: By paying attention to the structure of protocol 
that is depicted in Fig. 3, it is obvious that preventing 
the tag updates its secret values during the 𝑖𝑖th session, 
and presence of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡, in both 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 messages, allows 
an adversary to trace the tag after a successful 
eavesdropping. 
3.5 Tag forward traceability attack 
Providing non-forward traceability means, preventing 
an adversary from tracking the specific tag. Even, the 
owner of the tag must not be able to trace his/her tag 
after giving it over. The I2SRS protocol does not 
provide forward traceability immunity and the attacker 
can trace the tag 𝐷𝐷0, after 𝑁𝑁 runs of the protocol (∀𝑁𝑁). 
The attack is as follows: 
Learning phase: In the 𝑖𝑖th session of the protocol, an 
adversary 𝒜𝒜 sends a Corrupt query (𝐷𝐷0,𝐾𝐾′) and 
obtains {𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠}. Weaknesses of updating 
process in the I2SRS protocol, lets the attacker 
calculate 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+2 by performing two times PRNG on 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖.  
Challenge phase: An attacker 𝒜𝒜 chooses two fresh 
tags 𝐷𝐷0 and 𝐷𝐷1 and sends a Test query (𝐷𝐷0,𝐷𝐷1, 𝑖𝑖). After 
choosing 𝑏𝑏 ∈ {0,1} randomly, the attacker takes the 
tag 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 . Now, the attacker starts a new session by 
sending an Execute query (𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷0, 𝑖𝑖 + 2) and obtaining 
{𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖+2,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+2, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+2,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+2,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+2}. 
Guess phase: The attacker 𝒜𝒜 stops the game 𝑃𝑃 and 
after calculating {𝒻𝒻,ℊ,𝒽𝒽}, announces 𝑏𝑏′ as his/her 
guess of 𝑏𝑏 as follows: 
𝒻𝒻 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏))                          (20) 
ℊ = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ 𝒻𝒻                           (21) 
𝒽𝒽 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ ℊ)  ⊕𝒻𝒻           (22) 
𝑏𝑏′ = �0               𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼  𝒽𝒽 = 𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖+2            1               𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅                     (23) 
As a result, we have: 
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢(𝑘𝑘) =  �𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏′ = 𝑏𝑏) − 1
2
� = 1
2
 ≫ 𝜀𝜀                 (24) 
Proof: As stated before, the I2SRS protocol suffers 
from weaknesses in updating technique and 
transmitting constant messages. The attacker 
calculates 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+2, like mentioned in learning phase, and 
obtains 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+2 through 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+2. Moreover, 
constancy of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 in all sessions lets the attacker 
performs as: 
𝒽𝒽 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ ℊ)  ⊕𝒻𝒻      = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ 𝒻𝒻)  ⊕𝒻𝒻        = 𝐸𝐸 �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸 �𝐸𝐸�𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏���  
⊕𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏))      = 𝐸𝐸�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+2 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+2� ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+2𝑏𝑏 = 𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖+2(25) 
3.6 Tag backward traceability attack 
Backward traceability immunity assures the owner of 
the tag that no one will be able to know what happened 
to him/her before. One of the other vulnerability to the 
I2SRS protocol in privacy issue is lack of capability to 
prevent backward traceability attack. Reasons which 
result in this vulnerability are using the same value for 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 in all sessions and predictability of 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+1 in each 
session. An adversary 𝒜𝒜 performs this attack as 
follows: 
Learning phase: An adversary 𝒜𝒜 sends a Corrupt 
query (𝐷𝐷0,𝐾𝐾′) and obtains {𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠}. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 is a 16 bit string which is 
one of the elements of {𝔎𝔎1,𝔎𝔎2, … ,𝔎𝔎216}. Therefore, 
by knowing the updating process of the tag’s secret 
key, the attacker can guess 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖−1  at maximum runs of 216, which is calculated as: 
𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹  2 < 𝑖𝑖 < 216 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖−1 ∈ {𝔎𝔎1,𝔎𝔎2, … ,𝔎𝔎216}  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖−1)  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖−1 𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘  
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚                                                                        (26) 
We have the same relations for finding 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1, which are 
results of the same inaccuracy in updating procedure. 
Therefore, the attacker can guess 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1  at maximum 
runs of 216 as calculated: 
𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹  2 < 𝑖𝑖 < 216 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖−1 ∈ {𝒫𝒫1,𝒫𝒫2, … ,𝒫𝒫216}  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1)  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1 𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘  
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚                                                                        (27) 
Challenge phase: An attacker 𝒜𝒜 chooses two fresh 
tags 𝐷𝐷0 and 𝐷𝐷1 and sends a Test query (𝐷𝐷0,𝐷𝐷1, 𝑖𝑖). After 
choosing 𝑏𝑏 ∈ {0,1} randomly, the attacker takes the 
tag 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 , sends an Execute query (𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷0, 𝑖𝑖 − 1) and 
obtains {𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖−1,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖−1, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖−1,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−1,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1}. 
Guess phase: The attacker finishes the game 𝑃𝑃 and 
proclaims 𝑏𝑏′ as his/her guess of 𝑏𝑏 as follows: 
𝑏𝑏′ = �0            𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼  𝑀𝑀2𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗) ⊕𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥   1            𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅                                   (28) 
As a result, we have,     
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢(𝑘𝑘) =  �𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏′ = 𝑏𝑏) − 1
2
� = 1
2
≫ 𝜀𝜀     (29) 
Proof: Choosing a correct value for 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖−1, let the 
attacker calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗ in the (𝑖𝑖 − 1)th session by 
computing 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖−1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖−1. Then, 𝑀𝑀2𝑖𝑖+2 will be 
computable, if he/she knows the precise value for the 
access key. Subliminally, the attacker is able to 
perform backward traceability attack at maximum 
runs 2 × 216 = 217 computations. 
4. Improvements of Cai et al.’s protocols 
4.1 Improvements of the IHRMA protocol 
Structure of generating 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 can be highlighted as the 
greatest weak point in IHRMA protocol. So, we 
improve the IHRMA protocol as depicted in Fig 4. By 
changing the messages 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  to 𝐻𝐻(𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡), the 
attacker is prevented to access this message. One of 
the other vulnerability in the IHRMA protocol is the 
manner of producing and transmitting 𝐶𝐶3,  𝐶𝐶4 and 𝐶𝐶5  
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                    𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2⨁𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡                
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 calculate 𝐶𝐶3∗ = 𝐻𝐻(𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝐶𝐶2) 
     if 𝐶𝐶3∗ ≠ 𝐶𝐶3 
          reveal the protocol 
     else 
      Server is authenticated 
6.2 updating     𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 1 
Fig. 4. Improved IHRMA protocol 
messages, which let the attacker leave the protocol 
unfinished via varying 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡. By omitting 𝐶𝐶4 and 𝐶𝐶5 
messages through our improved protocol and 
generating 𝐶𝐶3 as 𝐻𝐻(𝐶𝐶2 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖), an adversary is not 
able to perform DoS attack. 
4.1.1 Tag/Reader impersonation resistance   
Presence of the 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 operator in the IHRMA protocol 
causes the occurrence of Notion 1. In our improved 
protocol, we generate 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 via a hash function which 
prevents the attacker from omitting 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 in 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖. 
Moreover, the attacker will not be able to substitute 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖+1 with (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖+1), cause that our new 
messages are preserved by hash functions. 
4.1.2 DoS attack resistance 
Presence of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 in 𝐶𝐶4 and 𝐶𝐶5 messages through the 
IHRMA protocol, let the attacker XOR a random 
number with them, which prevent the tag authenticate 
the back-end server and the reader as a legal parts of 
RFID system. In our improved protocol we generate 
𝐶𝐶3 as 𝐻𝐻(𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝐶𝐶2) and by omitting  𝐶𝐶4 and 𝐶𝐶5 
messages, 𝐶𝐶3 is the only oracle sends to the tag for 
authentication. Therefore, an adversary will not be 
able to alter messages as he/she desires, which 
provides a secure and assured authentication 
procedure. 
4.2 Improved version of I2SRS protocol 
Cai et al. [18] believe that Yoon’s protocol [13] does 
not provide the privacy of end-user, so they improved 
it and proposed the I2SRS protocol. As we described 
in Section 3, the I2SRS protocol is still vulnerable to 
different attacks, so this Section, propose a 
strengthened versions of Cai et al.’s protocol to 
overcome its weaknesses, which is shown in Fig. 5. 
Also, the security and privacy analysis of our proposed 
protocol is provided. 
It can be considered that using the 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 in producing 
𝑀𝑀1, is one of the main weaknesses in the I2SRS 
protocol, which helps the attacker to calculate 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛽𝛽. 
Moreover, updating procedure is the other weaknesses 
which result in traceability attacks. Therefore, we 
improve the I2SRS protocol by substituting 𝑀𝑀1, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 messages as follows, 
𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟)⨁𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡)⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖         (30) 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛                       (31) 
𝛾𝛾 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖)⨁𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖               (32) 
𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is a new random number generated by the tag. 
Moreover, the updating procedure will alter with, 
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+1 ⟵ 𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)                      (33)
Back-end server 
(𝐾𝐾0,𝐸𝐸0,𝛼𝛼0,𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛,𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛,𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) Reader (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) Tag (𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 For each 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 in server 
         Verify 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) ≟ 𝑉𝑉 
      For each tuple (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠;𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜,𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛) 
4.2 Calculate  
𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂 = 𝑀𝑀1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜 and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = 𝑀𝑀1⨁𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 
Verify𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟)⨁𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜)⨁𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜 
Verify 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟)⨁𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛)⨁𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 
      𝑥𝑥 = 𝑂𝑂/𝑁𝑁      
4.3 Verify 𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥)⨁𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥 ≟ 𝛾𝛾 
4.4 Calculate 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝛽𝛽⨁𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥 
      compute 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖⨁𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 
4.5 Calculate 𝑀𝑀2 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡∗) ⊕𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥  
4.6 Calculate 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 = 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷⊕ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟  
4.7 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) 
4.8 
               𝑀𝑀2,𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜,𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶                 
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
4.9 Updating  
      If 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑁𝑁 
            𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜 ↼ 𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) 
            𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 ↼ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥) 
            𝛼𝛼𝑜𝑜 ↼ 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥) 
      Else  
            𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥) 
      End if 
1. Generate 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 
1.2 
       𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟           
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
 
 
3.1  
𝑉𝑉 = 𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) 
3.2 
  𝑀𝑀1,𝛽𝛽,𝛾𝛾,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟,𝑉𝑉 
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚⨁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 
5.2 Verify 
𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟) ≟
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 
5.3 
          𝑀𝑀2             
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
2.1 Generate 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 and 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
2.2𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟)⨁𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡)⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 
2.3 𝛽𝛽 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖  
2.4 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖⨁𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  
2.5 𝛾𝛾 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖)⨁𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 
2.5 
             𝑀𝑀1,𝛽𝛽,𝛾𝛾,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖                 
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Verify 𝑀𝑀2 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ≟ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡) 
6.2 Updating 
                𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖+1 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) 
                𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+1 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) 
                𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ↼ 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) 
Fig 5. The improved version of I2SRS protocol.
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 ⟵ 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡⨁𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟⨁𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)                    (34) 
The improved protocol is depicted in Fig 5. Now, we 
describe how the applied modifications remove the 
mentioned weaknesses in Section 3. 
4.2.1 Secret reveal resistance 
We showed that weaknesses in creation of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and its 
updating manner, will result in achieving the correct 
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 by the attacker. But in our improved I2SRS 
protocol, changing 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 to 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖), prevents 
the attacker from obtaining 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 and 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖. 
4.2.2 Replay attack resistance  
An adversary 𝒜𝒜 tries to verify, denies or omits the 
transferred massages through impersonating a legal 
tag or reader, in replay attacks. In our improved 
protocol, usage of a new random number, 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, and 
change the structure of produced messages, makes it 
impossible for an adversary to re-use the eavesdropped 
ones through last sessions. 
4.2.3 Impersonation attack resistance 
An adversary 𝒜𝒜 is necessitous of knowing the values 
of 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 to compute 𝑀𝑀1, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 messages. 
By defining a new format for 𝑀𝑀1 and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, an adversary 
is not able to access the secret value of the improved 
I2SRS protocol. Beside, usage of the last stored 𝑀𝑀1 is 
not profitable for him/her in the current session. 
5. Results and comparisons 
5.1 Privacy guarantee 
The improved I2SRS protocol provides privacy 
through changing the method of updating procedure. 
Moreover, it prevents backward traceability, 
traceability and forward traceability attacks via 
defining the updated 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 as 𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛). 
After the presented analysis, a comparison of the 
privacy and the security of the improved IHRMA and 
I2SRS protocols with some similar protocols are 
presented in Table 1 and 2, respectively. As it  
Table 1. Comparison of improved IHRMA protocol with similar ones. 
 
              Feature           
  Protocols  
 
𝐴𝐴1 
 
𝐴𝐴2 
 
𝐴𝐴3 
 
𝐴𝐴4 
Cho et al. [17] NO NO NO NO 
IHRMA [18] NO NO NO NO 
Our protocol YES YES YES YES 
𝐴𝐴1: Protection from tag impersonation  
𝐴𝐴2: Protection from reader impersonation  
𝐴𝐴3: Prevention DoS attack 
𝐴𝐴4: Prevention of traceability attack 
Table 2. Comparison of improved I2SRS protocol with similar ones. 
 
   Feature           
  Protocols  
 
𝑊𝑊1 
 
 
𝑊𝑊2 
 
 
𝑊𝑊3 
 
 
𝑊𝑊4 
 
 
𝑊𝑊5 
 
 
𝑊𝑊6 
 
 
𝑊𝑊7 
 
Yeh et al. [6] YES NO YES YES NO NO YES 
Yoon [13] NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
I2SRS [18] NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Our protocol YES YE
S 
YES YES YE
S 
YE
S 
YES 
 
𝑊𝑊1: Secret parameter reveal resistance 
𝑊𝑊2: Protection of replay attack 
𝑊𝑊3: Protection impersonation attack 
𝑊𝑊4: Prevention DoS attack 
𝑊𝑊5: Prevention of traceability attack 
𝑊𝑊4: Prevention of forward traceability attack 
𝑊𝑊5: Prevention of backward traceability attack 
can be seen, the proposed protocols are protected 
against numerous attacks such as traceability, 
backward traceability, forward traceability, 
impersonation and DoS. Our proposed protocols 
provide secure and untraceable communications for 
RFID elements. 
6. Conclusions 
RFID applications are developing in different areas, 
which provide comfortability, rapidity and accuracy, 
but an important issue that must be considered is the 
assurance of a secure and private connection during 
the communication procedure. This paper investigated 
the performance and vulnerabilities of two recent 
authentication protocols proposed based on R-RAPSE 
rules. Based on Ouafi-Phan formal privacy model, it is 
shown that both the IHRMA and the I2SRS protocols 
cannot provide private authentication for RFID users. 
To enhance the proficiency of these two protocols, we 
proposed some improvements in this research. This 
paper proved that the proposed protocols provide 
required privacy and security against various types of 
attacks and can solve the drawbacks of the discussed 
works. 
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